Encyclopedia of Philosophy: THE EUTHYPHRO OF PLATO

« Euthyphro in the dialogue concedes that his definitions have not turned out as he wished.

We may well think, however, that he should have stood his ground, and pointed out that Socrate s was equivocating with the wo rd ‘because', using it in two different senses.

If we say that the godly is the godly because it is loved by the gods, we are talking about the word ‘godly'; the ‘because' invokes our stipulation about its meaning.

If we say that the gods love the holy because it is holy, the ‘because ' introduces the m otive of the gods' love, a nd we are not talking about the meanings of words.

In fact, once we realize the ambiguity of ‘because' there is no conflict between (A) and (B).

The point can be made in English b y pointing out that it is true both that (C) A judg e is a judge because he judges (that is why he is called a judge); and also that (D) A judge judges because he is a judge (he does it because it is his job). So Euthyphro should not have been checkmated so easily.

However, even if Socrates was persuaded to agree that there was nothing inconsistent in saying that what is holy is loved by the gods because it is holy, he could still go on to say, as he does in the dialogue, that even if that is so, being loved by the gods is only something that happens to what is holy: it does not tell us the essential nature of holiness in itself.Instead of godliness, should holiness be identified with justice? Socrates and Euthyphro agree that holiness seems to be only one part of justice, and Euthyphro sugg ests tha t it is justice in the service of the go ds, rather than justice in the service of humans.

Socrates latches onto the word ‘service'.

When we take care of horses, or dogs, or oxen, we do them various services which improve their con dition.

Can we in a similar way d o services to the god s? Can we make them any better than they are? Euthyphro points out that servants do not necessarily aim to improve their masters by serving them, but simply to assist them in their work.

What then, Socrates asks, is the gods' work, in which we can offer service? Euthyphro is unable to reply, and falls back on a definition of holiness as divine service in the form of prayer and sacrifice. So then, Socrates says, holiness is giving things to the gods in the hope of getting something back from them; a kind of trade.

But a trader can only hope to strike a bargain by offering his customer something which he needs or wants; so we must ask what good the gods gain from our gifts? Euthyphro cannot answer except by falling back on his earlier claim that holiness is something which the gods love.

He refuses to take the discussion further, and hastens on to his selfappointed task.. »