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Brito, Radulphus

Publié le 22/02/2012

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Radulphus Brito was a prominent master of arts at the University of Paris around 1300. In order to secure the foundation of concepts in extramental reality, he devised a system of four types of 'intentions', first and second, abstract and concrete. As a philosopher of language, similar concerns made him claim a formal identity between the modes of signifying (of words) and the modes of being signified (of things). Probably a native of Brittany, Radulphus Brito (Ralph the Breton) must have been born about 1270, as he became a master of arts in Paris no later than 1296 and doctor of theology, also in Paris, about 1311-2. He died in 1320 or later. The extant body of Radulphus' work is mainly unedited. Most of it relates to his activity as a master of arts, and comprises questions on the Aristotelian Organon, including Porphyry's Isagōgē, the anonymous Six Principles and Boethius' De differentiis topicis (On Topical Differences), and on Aristotle's De anima, Physics, Meteorology and Metaphysics, as well as on some mathematical and astronomical textbooks. There are also sophismata (investigations of particular logical problems), and a work on grammatical theory, Quaestiones super Priscianum Minorem (Questions on Priscian Minor), also called Modi significandi (Modes of Signifying). From Radulphus' career in theology we have questions on Peter Lombard's Sentences, a Quodlibet and Quaestiones in Vesperis (Evening Questions).

« Likewise for the second intentions, the modes of being form the basis of concept formation, but this time the modes in question are not proper to some nature but common to natures.

The abstract second intention, (for example, universality), is a concept derived from the common feature of being capable of occurring in several individuals or types.

This feature is shared by, for example, 'man' and 'donkey' , both of which can occur in several individuals, and also by 'animal' , which can occur in several species.

Our intellect need perform no comparison to construct a Porphyrian tree; sensory acquaintance with a single individual suffices to recognize, for instance, that sensing (which characterizes animals) is a trait apt to be shared by more beings than reason (which is reserved for humans).

The corresponding concrete second intention (universal) is the thing (man) considered simply as conceived of by means of the formal concept of universality. Earlier thinkers had held that second intentions arise from inspection and comparison of things already grasped by the mind.

Brito wanted to generate them through direct inspection of the entities that gave rise to the first intentions.

His aim was clearly to strengthen the link of the second intentions to reality by making them thoughts of things rather than of thoughts. The linguistic theory (modism) prevalent in Radulphus' days took grammatical categories to be features (modes of signifying) of significative words but derived from features (modes of being) of things ( Language, medieval theories of ).

Some decades of discussion had revealed weaknesses of the theory, and Brito fought an uphill battle to save it.

Thus, to avoid difficulties arising from the existence of equivocal words, modes of signifying had been split into active modes, residing in words, and passive ones (modes of being signified), residing in things, such that one active mode could correspond to several passive ones.

Seeing that this compromised the basic modistic idea of deriving features of thought and of language from features of reality, Radulphus claimed that the active modes are formally, but not materially, identical with passive modes, which in turn are materially identical with passive modes of being and of understanding.

This view was taken over by the influential grammarian Thomas of Erfurt.. »

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