From Scott v.

« liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights, Governments are instituted, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. The general words above quoted would seem to embrace the whole human family, and if they were used in a similar instrument at this day would be so understood.But it is too clear for dispute that the enslaved African race were not intended to be included, and formed no part of the people who framed and adopted thisdeclaration, for if the language, as understood in that day, would embrace them, the conduct of the distinguished men who framed the Declaration of Independencewould have been utterly and flagrantly inconsistent with the principles they asserted, and instead of the sympathy of mankind to which they so confidently appealed,they would have deserved and received universal rebuke and reprobation. Yet the men who framed this declaration were great men — high in literary acquirements, high in their sense of honor, and incapable of asserting principlesinconsistent with those on which they were acting.

They perfectly understood the meaning of the language they used, and how it would be understood by others, andthey knew that it would not in any part of the civilized world be supposed to embrace the negro race, which, by common consent, had been excluded from civilizedGovernments and the family of nations, and doomed to slavery.

They spoke and acted according to the then established doctrines and principles, and in the ordinarylanguage of the day, and no one misunderstood them.

The unhappy black race were separated from the white by indelible marks, and laws long before established,and were never thought of or spoken of except as property, and when the claims of the owner or the profit of the trader were supposed to need protection. This state of public opinion had undergone no change when the Constitution was adopted, as is equally evident from its provisions and language. The brief preamble sets forth by whom it was formed, for what purposes, and for whose benefit and protection.

It declares that it is formed by the people of theUnited States—that is to say, by those who were members of the different political communities in the several States—and its great object is declared to be to securethe blessings of liberty to themselves and their posterity.

It speaks in general terms of the people of the United States, and of citizens of the several States, when it isproviding for the exercise of the powers granted or the privileges secured to the citizen.

It does not define what description of persons are intended to be includedunder these terms, or who shall be regarded as a citizen and one of the people.

It uses them as terms so well understood that no further description or definition wasnecessary. But there are two clauses in the Constitution which point directly and specifically to the negro race as a separate class of persons, and show clearly that they were notregarded as a portion of the people or citizens of the Government then formed. One of these clauses reserves to each of the thirteen States the right to import slaves until the year 1808 if it thinks proper.

And the importation which it thussanctions was unquestionably of persons of the race of which we are speaking, as the traffic in slaves in the United States had always been confined to them.

And bythe other provision the States pledge themselves to each other to maintain the right of property of the master by delivering up to him any slave who may have escapedfrom his service, and be found within their respective territories. By the first above-mentioned clause, therefore, the right to purchase and hold this property is directly sanctioned and authorized for twenty years by the people whoframed the Constitution.

And by the second, they pledge themselves to maintain and uphold the right of the master in the manner specified, as long as theGovernment they then formed should endure.

And these two provisions show conclusively that neither the description of persons therein referred to nor theirdescendants were embraced in any of the other provisions of the Constitution, for certainly these two clauses were not intended to confer on them or their posteritythe blessings of liberty, or any of the personal rights so carefully provided for the citizen. No one of that race had ever migrated to the United States voluntarily; all of them had been brought here as articles of merchandise.

The number that had beenemancipated at that time were but few in comparison with those held in slavery, and they were identified in the public mind with the race to which they belonged, andregarded as a part of the slave population rather than the free.

It is obvious that they were not even in the minds of the framers of the Constitution when they wereconferring special rights and privileges upon the citizens of a State in every other part of the Union. Indeed, when we look to the condition of this race in the several States at the time, it is impossible to believe that these rights and privileges were intended to beextended to them … Undoubtedly a person may be a citizen, that is, a member of the community who form the sovereignty, although he exercises no share of the political power and isincapacitated from holding particular offices.

Women and minors, who form a part of the political family, cannot vote, and when a property qualification is requiredto vote or hold a particular office, those who have not the necessary qualification cannot vote or hold the office, yet they are citizens. So, too, a person may be entitled to vote by the law of the State, who is not a citizen even of the State itself.

And in some of the States of the Union, foreigners notnaturalized are allowed to vote.

And the State may give the right to free negroes and mulattoes, but that does not make them citizens of the State, and still less of theUnited States.

And the provision in the Constitution giving privileges and immunities in other States does not apply to them. Neither does it apply to a person who, being the citizen of a State, migrates to another State.

For then he becomes subject to the laws of the State in which he lives,and he is no longer a citizen of the State from which he removed.

And the State in which he resides may then, unquestionably, determine his status or condition, andplace him among the class of persons who are not recognised as citizens, but belong to an inferior and subject race, and may deny him the privileges and immunitiesenjoyed by its citizens. But so far as mere rights of person are concerned, the provision in question is confined to citizens of a State who are temporarily in another State without taking uptheir residence there.

It gives them no political rights in the State as to voting or holding office, or in any other respect.

For a citizen of one State has no right toparticipate in the government of another.

But if he ranks as a citizen in the State to which he belongs, within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States,then, whenever he goes into another State, the Constitution clothes him, as to the rights of person, will all the privileges and immunities which belong to citizens ofthe State. And if persons of the African race are citizens of a State, and of the United States, they would be entitled to all of these privileges and immunities in every State, andthe State could not restrict them, for they would hold these privileges and immunities under the paramount authority of the Federal Government, and its courts wouldbe bound to maintain and enforce them, the Constitution and laws of the State to the contrary notwithstanding.

And if the States could limit or restrict them, or placethe party in an inferior grade, this clause of the Constitution would be unmeaning, and could have no operation, and would give no rights to the citizen when inanother State.

He would have none but what the State itself chose to allow him.

This is evidently not the construction or meaning of the clause in question.

Itguaranties rights to the citizen, and the State cannot withhold them.

And these rights are of a character and would lead to consequences which make it absolutelycertain that the African race were not included under the name of citizens of a State, and were not in the contemplation of the framers of the Constitution when theseprivileges and immunities were provided for the protection of the citizen in other States … No one, we presume, supposes that any change in public opinion or feeling, in relation to this unfortunate race, in the civilized nations of Europe or in this country,should induce the court to give to the words of the Constitution a more liberal construction in their favor than they were intended to bear when the instrument wasframed and adopted.

Such an argument would be altogether inadmissible in any tribunal called on to interpret it.

If any of its provisions are deemed unjust, there is amode prescribed in the instrument itself by which it may be amended; but while it remains unaltered, it must be construed now as it was understood at the time of its. »