Woodrow Wilson et les "Fourteen Points"

Analysing of ‘The Fable of the Fourteen Points: Woodrow Wilson and National Self-Determination’ by Trygve Throntveit. The Fourteen points were in and unto themselves almost the sole creation of one man, and as such, they make up a résumé of political work which comprises of more than just an individual’s administrative demands, but also that man’s beliefs, ideals and inherent interests. Throntveit suggests the main motivation for Wilson’s drafting of these points and his attempts at imposing structured peace upon Europe stem, ultimately, from his desire to create a political environment “under which citizens could help shape the policies and goals of their governments”; a system which could guarantee peace enacted by its populace, not war enacted by its government. At its most basic sense, Wilson’s international strategy was a simple readjustment and extrapolation of an already proven interior, domestic, policy; he viewed the Confederate system of the United States, as a permanent solution, or at the very least, a profound basis for resolution, of the European issue, an “organic and civic” model from which, placating inter-state relations, responsible appointment of Self-government and, above all, lasting peace could originate.Throntveit also highlights how Wilson’s personal interest in historical examination played a key role in the final drafting of the Fourteen points. In his mind, systems of government were little more than the latent “products of history” and, if anything, “history taught” that imposed governments could rarely survive the tumultuous instabilities that they were destined to eventually encounter, and even Monarchical systems, the order of the day, could not remain stagnant and unresponsive to its subjects; whatever the “ force that sustained the authority of the tribal chieftain or of that chief of chiefs, the king”, it would not survive “independent of the consent”. This “mechanical imposition” of past systems would certainly not serve Wilson’s desired peace, instead the necessity for “compact, living, organic” systems, became apparent; “civic”-minded states, inherently inspired by his Presbyterian notions that “duty to God implied duty to one’s neighbour”. Once again “history taught” that only within an environment of ideal “civic ethos” could a Europe be founded “with both the flexibility and stability a changing world demanded”, and furthermore any true civic obligation to collective national objectives shown by any state, proved a responsibility and accountability capable with the entrustment of “Self-government… the steadiness and self-control of political maturity”; the basis of point V.The over-arching goal of the Fourteen points was “to create an international environment in which self-governing institutions could take root and thrive in a variety of contexts”, an ideal of civil “states responsible for their actions”; a model which required lasting European peace. Throntveit summarises Wilson’s belief that the disruption of international interests and the outbreak of continental war had been a direct result of archaic, uninvolving systems of politics, “where people where nowhere consulted by their rulers”, and had arrived “without discussion, without… counsel”; as such “the peace of the world must henceforth depend on a new and more wholesome diplomacy”. This diplomacy would be guaranteed through the pursuit of both “a League of Nations” and “a peace without victory”.Thusly to solidify the “thought and purpose” of this enterprise, Wilson drafted his Fourteen points. The first six of which dealt with the broad goals which instigated his ingress into the European theatre, “open diplomacy, freedom of the seas, abolition of trade barriers, arms reduction, [and] colonial reform”; objectives which would not only allow, but also catalyse the evolution of his Civic Ideal; and the subsequent eight points, which directly attempted to remedy unambiguous territorial claims, would further serve to preserve this model, through the prevention of “depredations by governments operating solely on the principle of force”. “[Rounding] out the message properly” was the final and most fundamental goal of the draft, the demand for “a general association of nations” with the explicit intention of “affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike”, an idyllic, civic, European confederacy; the League of Nations. Although support was sluggishly developing inside the certain disenfranchised camps of his Imperialist allies, it was from within the boundaries of a fluctuating Russian state that we first discern the assimilation of comparable pro-Wilsonian doctrine; with the Provisional Government’s declaration, on April 17, 1917, its desire for “the establishment of a permanent peace on the basis of the self-determination of peoples”. Throntveit clarifies however, that though this assertion was superficially hospitable of Wilson’s rhetoric, it was nonetheless confounded by an unavoidable, and fundamental, dissimilarity in belief: the issue of Self-determination versus Self-government. Whereas Wilson sought the careful, steady emplacement of Civically-responsible governments, Lenin sought the disintegrating influences and sudden upheavals of “ethnic nationalism”, and although the former was careful not to label the drafting of the Fourteen points as “counter-manifesto” to these “potential allies in the fight for a liberal peace”, the careful and determined wording of their conception exposes it as being heavily antithetical to the “Bolshevik pronouncements [of] ethnic-nationalist aspiration”.Yet the actions taken by the Russian proletariat and, the deceptively similar parallels between the two political creeds, would serve as an opportunistic prospect for Wilson and his pursuit of allied acceptance. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk provided a “catalyst [for] a diplomatic and ideological revolution”, and Trotsky’s “democratic peace [founded] on the basis of self-determination of nations” forced the seemingly “cynical imperialism” of “Western democracy” into a difficult position, would this “self-determination” spread to such servile regions as “Ireland, Egypt, India, Madagascar Indo-China, etc?”. In response, Labour movements within both England and France sprang to action; the British Left published a “Memorandum on War Aims” demanding “a peace of no annexations, an end to economic warfare, and a supernatural authority comprising an international legislature, world court and meditation council”, whilst the latter’s insisted on an amendment of the post-war objectives to reflect the ever-advertised “international justice”.Wilson had his audience, his support and his means for the subdual of imperialist disagreement. Scandalised by the exposure of Secret-treaties, and anxiously concerned over the steadily budding voice of the political Left, Lloyd George and Clemenceau found themselves with little option but to fully align themselves with Wilson’s “pragmatically internationalist” platform, and any supplementary efforts to outdo the Bolshevik’s lead global moral popularity would require a handily anti-imperialist doctrine, further provoking their tolerance for American ideals of self-governing. Point VI- Although desire to keep Russians in war, praised Bolsheviks negotiators (with Germans) to “secure justice from central powers”, sought evacuation of military presence to allow “the independent determination of her own political development and national policy” 463 Mixed reaction from Russia IZVESTIA ()official organ of the Central Executive Committee in Petrograd liked the 14 points, but PRAVDA, organ of the Bolshevik party called Wilson a “capitalist imperialist pretending at democracy” Within the entirety of the Fourteen Points, it is point V, the call for “A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined”, which has garnered the largest acquaintance with political misinterpretation. This is not a determined demand for colonial relinquishment, this is a call to fairly measure the desires of Imperialized populations against the “Equitable” desires of controlling states, an exacting case by case reconstruction of international affairs in accordance with Wilson’s civic notion of self-government, which Throntviet once again finds himself clarifying from the nationalistic drive of self-determination, as an earned “form of character”, a “long discipline which gives people self-possession… the self-control of political maturity”.Wilson’s (at least initial) definition of point V is exactly this, a desire to re-organise the provably ineffective political regimes and inter-continental relations of Europe, and their mirrored colonial activities, and to bring about a conscientious change within the politics of the old World towards something more recognisably found within the Confederate ideals of the United States, not simply the creation of damaging “Tribal Nationalism” and the gifting of desired ethnic independencies. Throntviet states that point V calls for the careful step by step re-examination of all colonial claims with the eventual goal of pragmatically replacing out-dated, forcefully coercive Imperialism, the “self-interested…violent interference” of archaic models, like Germany’s, with functioning, politically co-operative powers, as seen with the British model; “a union of free peoples acting on free impulses”, a collection of geographically, and more importantly, ethnically, diverging populations working towards the triumph of all; a Government which legitimises itself by serving the interests of all its subjects. This is not the wanton appeasing of all servile races, nor a blatant division by ethnicity, it is something far more understated and analytical, an intention that “strategic boundaries must be considered and must modify boundaries based on nationality”.Throntviet examines both the historical behaviour and actions of the points’ author, as well as his underlying signature found within the article’s genesis. The influence of Lippmann’s “The Stakes of Diplomacy” on both Wilson, and his ideals, is vividly apparent, with depictions of war’s substitution with “political method” and notions of “increasingly obsolete geographical barriers” running throughout. Point XI for example and it’s attempt to pacify the Baltic question is heavily influenced by Wilson’s pragmatic practice of seeking division through political reason and future co-operation, and avoiding division through ethnic difference and nationalistic desire. It states that “the relations of the several Balkan states to one another [must be] determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality”; in short it is an un-incendiary attempt to settle border squabbling, and the meddling of “Great Powers”, not the creation of new nationalistic identities. However since the publication of the Fourteen points, point V has found itself a misconstrued assertion of ethnic freedom, an ironic rallying call for Self-determination over Self-government; a confusion which was not aided by Lloyd George’s early murky and conflicting declaration of January 5, 1918, wherein he labelled the principle of “Self-government” as “political independence for ethnic groups alone”. Further confusion arose due to the very nature of Wilson’s initial ideology; point V was never designed to be the definitive solution for all colonial difficulties and especially not as a cause for immediate decolonisation, rather it poised itself as an organic guideline, the preliminary steps from which political reconciliation could be reached. It, as such suffered the inevitable fate of shallow inspection, public desire and gradual re-classification.