Persian Gulf War.

« to “use all necessary means” to force Iraq from Kuwait if Iraq remained in the country after January 15, 1991.

The Iraqis rejected the ultimatum.

Soon after the vote,the United States agreed to a direct meeting between Secretary of State James Baker and Iraq’s foreign minister.

The two sides met on January 9.

Neither offered tocompromise.

The United States underscored the ultimatum, and the Iraqis refused to comply with it, even threatening to attack Israel.

For the United States, themeeting was its way of showing the conflict could not be resolved through negotiation. A large minority of the U.S.

population opposed military action.

Opponents were concerned that the armed forces would suffer large casualties and argued that the onlyreason for the invasion was to guarantee a cheap supply of oil.

Many such opponents thought economic sanctions would eventually force Iraq to leave Kuwait.

PresidentGeorge Bush maintained that larger political principles were involved and that economic sanctions would not work.

He also argued that the UN resolution gave him theauthority to use military force.

Other Americans believed the president did not have the constitutional authority to order an attack without a congressional declaration ofwar.

On January 12, 1991, the U.S.

Congress narrowly passed a resolution authorizing the president to use force, nullifying the domestic debate. IV THE COALITION ATTACKS BY AIR When the UN deadline of January 15 passed without an Iraqi withdrawal, a vast majority of coalition members joined in the decision to attack Iraq.

A few members,such as Morocco, elected not to take part in the military strikes.

In the early morning of January 17, 1991, coalition forces began a massive air attack on Iraqi targets. The air assault had three goals: to attack Iraqi air defenses, to disrupt command and control, and to weaken ground forces in and around Kuwait.

The coalition madeswift progress against Iraq’s air defenses, giving the coalition almost uncontested control of the skies over Iraq and Kuwait.

The second task, disrupting command andcontrol, was larger and more difficult.

It required attacks on the Iraqi electrical system, communications centers, roads and bridges, and other military and governmenttargets.

These targets were often located in civilian areas and were typically used by both civilians and the military.

Although the coalition air forces often used veryprecise weapons, the attacks caused many civilian casualties and completely disrupted Iraqi civilian life.

The third task, weakening Iraq’s ground forces, was larger still.The coalition used less sophisticated weaponry to strike Iraqi defensive positions in both Iraq and Kuwait, to destroy their equipment, and to undermine morale.

Afterfive and a half weeks of intense bombing and more than 100,000 flights by coalition planes, Iraq’s forces were severely damaged. In an attempt to pry the coalition apart, Iraq fired Scud missiles at both Saudi Arabia and Israel, which especially disrupted Israeli civilian life.

Iraq could thus portray itsArab adversaries as fighting on the side of Israel.

The strategy failed to split the coalition, in part because the Israeli government did not retaliate.

Iraq also issued thinlyveiled threats that it would use chemical and biological weapons.

The United States hinted in return that such an attack might provoke a massive response, possiblyincluding the use of nuclear weapons.

Iraqi ground forces also initiated a limited amount of ground fighting, occupying the Saudi border town of Khafji on January 30before being driven back. One month into the air war, the Iraqis began negotiating with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) over a plan to withdraw from Kuwait.

Had this initiativecome before the start of the coalition’s attack, it might have split the coalition; now it simply seemed a sign that the war was weighing heavily on Iraq.

The war madediplomacy difficult for Iraq: officials had to travel overland to Iran and then fly to Moscow to ferry messages back and forth.

Sensing victory, the coalition united behinda demand for Iraq’s unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. V LAND WAR On February 24 the coalition launched its long-anticipated land offensive.

The bulk of the attack was in southwestern Iraq, where coalition forces first moved north, thenturned east toward the Iraqi port of Al Başrah.

This maneuver surrounded Kuwait, encircling the Iraqi forces there and in southern Iraq, and allowed coalition forces(mainly Arab) to move up the coast and take Kuwait city.

Some Iraqi units resisted, but the coalition offensive advanced more quickly than anticipated.

Thousands ofIraqi troops surrendered.

Others deserted.

Iraq then focused its efforts on withdrawing its elite units and sabotaging Kuwaiti infrastructure and industry.

Many oil wellswere set on fire, creating huge oil lakes, thick black smoke, and other environmental damage.

Two days after the ground war began, Iraq announced it was leavingKuwait. On February 28, with the collapse of Iraqi resistance and the recapture of Kuwait—thereby fulfilling the coalition’s stated goals—the coalition declared a cease-fire.

Theland war had lasted precisely 100 hours.

The cease-fire came shortly before coalition forces would have surrounded Iraqi forces.

On March 2 the UN Security Councilissued a resolution laying down the conditions for the cease-fire, which were accepted by Iraq in a meeting of military commanders on March 3.

More extensive aims,such as overthrowing the Iraqi government or destroying Iraqi forces, did not have the support of all coalition members.

Most Arab members, for example, believed thewar was fought to restore one Arab country and not to destroy another.

The United States also worried that extending the goal would have involved them in endlessfighting. The Iraqis achieved none of their initial goals.

Rather than enhancing their economic, military, and political position, they were economically devastated, militarilydefeated, and politically isolated.

Yet because the government and many of the military forces remained intact, the Iraqis could claim mere survival as a victory.

Thesurviving military forces were used a short time later to suppress two postwar rebellions: one involving Shia Muslims in southern Iraq and one involving Kurds in thenorth. Almost all of the casualties occurred on the Iraqi side.

While estimates during the war had ranged from 10,000 to 100,000 Iraqis killed, Western military experts nowagree that Iraq sustained between 20,000 and 35,000 casualties.

The coalition losses were extremely light by comparison: 240 were killed, 148 of whom wereAmerican.

The number of wounded totaled 776, of whom 458 were American. VI CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR The end of the fighting left some key issues unresolved, including UN sanctions against Iraq, which did not end with the war.

On April 2, 1991, the Security Council laidout strict demands for ending the sanctions: Iraq would have to accept liability for damages, destroy its chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles, foregoany nuclear weapons programs, and accept international inspections to ensure these conditions were met.

If Iraq complied with these and other resolutions, the UNwould discuss removing the sanctions.

Iraq resisted, claiming that its withdrawal from Kuwait was sufficient compliance. Many Western observers believed the victory was hollow because Saddam Hussein was still in power.

At first, when Hussein was greatly weakened, Western powersbelieved a rebellion might succeed in overthrowing him.

Meanwhile, potential rebels within Iraq believed they might receive international help if they rebelled.

But whenthe Shia population of southern Iraq rebelled shortly after the cease-fire, they were greeted not with international help but with Iraqi military forces returning from thesouthern front.

It quickly became clear that the rebels would receive no international help, although several governments gave them verbal support.

Under the terms ofthe cease-fire, which established “no-fly zones” in the north and south, Iraqis could not attack the Shias with airplanes, but could use helicopters, which they did togreat effect.

Spontaneous and loosely organized, the rebellion was crushed almost as quickly as it arose. The defeat of the Shias made the debate over helping Iraqi rebels even more urgent.

Ultimately, however, most Western governments decided that if Husseincollapsed, Iraq might disintegrate, ushering in a new round of regional instability.

A short while later, Kurds in the north of the country rebelled, and they too received. »