Nicaraguan Revolution.

Nicaraguan Revolution. I INTRODUCTION Nicaraguan Revolution, uprising and civil war, beginning in 1978, that overthrew the long dictatorship of the Somoza family in Nicaragua and replaced it with a leftist government. The rebellion was led by a Marxist guerrilla force, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), known as the Sandinistas. With widespread popular support, the group deposed Anastasio Somoza Debayle and took power in July 1979. Nicaragua's new rulers attempted to institute revolutionary political, social, and economic changes. The revolutionary government achieved some success in land reform, literacy, and health programs, but their efforts were hampered by their own inexperience, by severe economic problems, and by strong opposition from the United States. By the mid-1980s the government was focusing on fighting U.S.-supported rebels trying to overthrow it. In 1990, with the economy on the verge of collapse, the Sandinistas lost national elections, ending Nicaragua's revolutionary experiment but leaving the country fundamentally changed. II BACKGROUND From 1936 to 1979 Nicaragua was ruled by the Somoza family, Latin America's longest-lasting dictatorship. Founded by Anastasio Somoza García, family rule had been continued by his sons Luis Somoza Debayle and Anastasio Somoza Debayle. The Somozas were able to stay in power because they controlled the National Guard, the nation's combined military and police force, which had been created by the United States. The family also cultivated U.S. support for their regime, naming the capital's main street for President Franklin D. Roosevelt and letting the Central Intelligence Agency use Nicaragua as a base for launching the unsuccessful 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. The Somozas used their power to make themselves the richest family in Central America, controlling much of Nicaragua's wealth for their own benefit and profiting by corruption. Their rule provided stability that contributed to impressive economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s, but the majority of Nicaragua's people did not share in this progress and lived in conditions of extreme poverty. Those who opposed the Somozas were often imprisoned, exiled, tortured, or killed. Political repression and corruption worsened after Anastasio Somoza Debayle became president in 1967. The extent and cost of the Somozas' corrupt rule became clear when an earthquake devastated Managua, Nicaragua's capital, in 1972. As many as 10,000 people died in the earthquake, hundreds of thousands more were left homeless, and much of the city was destroyed. The Somozas and the National Guard stole relief funds and made huge profits by speculating in land used to house desperate refugees. Their actions, combined with worsening economic conditions, convinced most Nicaraguans that a change of government was needed. The major group trying to overthrow the Somoza government was the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). It was founded in 1961 by a small group of university students, headed by Carlos Fonseca, Silvio Mayorga, and Tomás Borge. They received encouragement and support from Cuban revolutionary leader Fidel Castro, in part because of the Somozas' role in the Bay of Pigs invasion. While influenced by Marxist and Leninist ideology (see Communism), the FSLN had no direct ties to Nicaragua's Communist Party. They took their name from Augusto Sandino, a Nicaraguan general who led a guerrilla campaign against U.S. intervention in the country from 1927 to 1933 and was murdered by Somoza's National Guard in 1934. The Sandinistas opposed the Somozas and U.S. influence over Nicaragua, and called for radical social and political change to redistribute wealth and power. They gained support among some rural Nicaraguans and students, but their early efforts at guerrilla warfare were defeated by the National Guard, costing both Fonseca and Mayorga their lives. Other Nicaraguans who tried to oust the Somozas also failed. By the 1970s prominent business leaders and Catholic Church officials joined the criticism of the Somoza regime. Most of the political opposition formed a united front headed by Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, editor of La Prensa, the nation's largest newspaper. Increasingly, they concentrated their efforts on influencing U.S. policy to force Somoza from power. They found support from Democrats in the U.S. Congress and, beginning in 1977, from the administration of President Jimmy Carter, whose foreign policy emphasized respect for human rights. III THE REVOLUTION In January 1978 Chamorro was assassinated in Managua, probably by associates of Somoza. This set off weeks of anti-government riots and demonstrations, a national strike, and scattered efforts at armed uprisings. While Somoza maintained control, his regime was shaken, and international opposition began to grow. In August a group of Sandinista commandos, led by Edén Pastora, known as Commandante Zero, seized Managua's National Palace, taking many members of the Nicaraguan Congress as hostages. Through negotiations, the Sandinistas won the release of many FSLN prisoners, a ransom, publication of their call for the population to rebel, and safe passage out of the country for the commandos. The Sandinistas' successful raid encouraged anti-Somoza forces, and uprisings broke out across the country. Somoza's troops defeated these with great brutality, bombing and shelling civilian neighborhoods. The government's actions caused hundreds of Nicaraguans to join the FSLN and brought increased international pressures for a negotiated settlement to the conflict. A U.S.-sponsored effort at mediation collapsed, leaving the moderate political opposition discredited for negotiating with the dictatorship. To most Nicaraguans, even middle-class and business interests, the Sandinistas appeared to be the only alternative to continuing rule by the Somoza regime. The United States imposed limited economic sanctions against Somoza, but more important, Costa Rica, Venezuela, and Panama began covertly supporting the Sandinistas. In May 1979 fighting broke out again as the Sandinistas announced a final offensive and called for a nationwide rebellion. This time the National Guard could not control the situation, and the rebels took large areas of the country. Battles were fought in major cities, including León, Masaya, and Managua, where National Guard planes bombed neighborhoods where people supported the Sandinistas. An emergency meeting of the Organization of American States called on Somoza to resign, rejecting a U.S. call to send peacekeeping troops to Nicaragua. The United States tried to negotiate a transition to a broad coalition government and to preserve some parts of the National Guard, but that effort failed. With much of the nation in Sandinista hands and with Managua surrounded, Somoza fled into exile, and the once-powerful National Guard disintegrated. On July 19, Sandinista forces marched into Managua and took control of the country. IV REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT The new Sandinista government was led by a five-member junta, or council, installed by the FSLN. Headed by Sandinista military commander Daniel Ortega Saavedra, it included two other Sandinista officials and two non-Sandinistas: businessman Alfonso Robelo Callejas and Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, widow of slain newspaper editor Pedro Joaquin Chamorro. A broad-based cabinet was established, with a majority of non-Sandinistas, and plans were announced for an appointed Council of State, made up of representatives from political parties and worker, business, women's, and other groups. The Coucil of State would function as a legislature until elections were held. However, it quickly became clear that real power was not held by the formal government, but by the nine Sandinista commanders who made up the FSLN's National Directorate. Within a year Robelo and Violeta Chamorro left the junta, and the Council of State was reorganized to guarantee an overwhelming Sandinista majority. Elections were postponed, restrictions were placed on the media, and relations with the Roman Catholic Church became increasingly tense. Two non-Sandinistas replaced Robelo and Chamorro on the junta, but they had little power, and the government's relations with opposition political parties and the private business sector deteriorated. A Domestic Policy The Sandinista-led government that took power in 1979 inherited huge problems. The war to oust Somoza had killed as many as 50,000 people; hundreds of thousands more were homeless or refugees in neighboring countries, and many areas were in ruins. Widespread war damage had devastated the economy, which was also burdened by a massive foreign debt of about $1.6 billion. Trained business and professional leaders streamed out of the country, which suffered from food and fuel shortages, poor health conditions, widespread poverty, and a high rate of illiteracy. Calling itself a government of national reconstruction, the new regime set out to rebuild the economy, create a new political structure, and improve social conditions, especially for Nicaragua's poorest citizens. The government quickly seized properties belonging to the Somozas and their supporters, including businesses and land. But it pledged to support private property, to respect human rights, and to pursue a non-aligned foreign policy, following neither the United States nor the Soviet Union. At first, the new government received extensive international aid from many sources, including the United States. Under the Sandinistas, the government assumed a larger role in the economy. It tried to create a mixture of private businesses and socialist-style, state-controlled enterprises. Most land and businesses remained in private hands, except for those taken from the Somozas. But Sandinista policies limited how private owners could utilize their property, which prompted opposition from many business leaders. The government took control of all banks and of foreign trade, which was critical because Nicaragua traditionally depended on exports of agricultural products for revenue with which to import food and other goods. Labor was dominated by FSLN-affiliated unions, and the government exercised a dominant role in labor-management disputes, but independent unions survived. The government embarked on a sweeping program of land reform, redistributing land taken from Somoza supporters and parts of some large estates to small farmers and rural laborers. The program also created state-owned farms and cooperatives, in which small farmers banded together to get credit and produce goods, often on land given them by the government. Sandinista policy sought to increase production of food for the malnourished population and to foster revenue-producing export crops, but in the 1980s agricultural production declined. The Sandinistas launched intensive efforts to organize all sectors of society to help rebuild Nicaragua and support their revolutionary goals. Local Defense Committees were formed in urban areas, both to promote citizen involvement and to extend Sandinista political control by keeping watch on dissenters. In the country, Sandinista unions and other organizations were formed for farmers and agricultural workers. These grassroots groups helped implement the government's agriculture policies, and represented their members in government councils. Other Sandinista organizations were established specifically for women, students, and youth. Improving education and health care was a high priority in the early 1980s for the government, which especially targeted poor and rural areas that had lacked services under Somoza. A national literacy campaign was launched in 1980 and reduced illiteracy from 50 percent---one of the highest rates in the region--to an estimated 13 percent, an effort that received international recognition. Education spending expanded, and the number of schools, teachers, and students dramatically increased. Government health care was made widely available, public hospitals and clinics were built, and brigades of community volunteers carried out vaccination campaigns. Infant mortality rates and diseases were significantly reduced. B Foreign Relations Nicaragua's revolution made the country a focus of international attention and involved it in tensions between Communist and non-Communist countries. Cuba supplied Nicaragua with many teachers and health workers, but also sent military advisors. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics also supplied assistance, as did many Eastern and Western European nations. Most Latin American nations supported the fight against the Somozas, but relations began to cool as Nicaragua's government moved steadily to the left, and revolutionary violence began to occur in other parts of Central America. Charges that the Sandinistas were supporting guerrillas fighting the government of El Salvador became a major issue by the end of 1980. From the start, relations with the United States were strained. The FSLN associated the United States with the Somozas, remembering long U.S. support for the dictatorship and the U.S. role in creating the National Guard. It also viewed the United States as an opponent to fundamental reforms in Latin America, which helped to keep dictators and the wealthy in power while the poor suffered. A line in the Sandinista anthem labeled Americans as "enemies of humanity." U.S. officials, in turn, were suspicious of FSLN ties to Cuba and the USSR and of the Marxist-Leninist ideology of many Sandinistas leaders. After the revolution, the Carter administration provided aid for Nicaragua and made an effort to work with the new government, despite strong opposition in Congress. That policy ended, however, with the growing conflict in El Salvador between guerrillas and the U.S.-backed government and with the election of President Ronald Reagan in 1980. Reagan was strongly anti-Communist and believed that Central American revolutionary movements were supported by the USSR. After Reagan took office in 1981, the United States worked to isolate Nicaragua and supported rebels trying to overthrow the Sandinista government. V COUNTERREVOLUTION Ever since they took power, the Sandinistas had been confronted with armed opposition. At first this was limited to small groups of former National Guard members, largely based in Honduras. By the end of 1981 these groups were receiving instruction from Argentine officers and some covert support from the United States. As opposition to FSLN policies grew, other groups joined the armed rebel movement. These included disgruntled business leaders, conservative farmers (especially from northern Nicaragua), and even disillusioned Sandinistas--notably Edén Pastora, who launched an armed movement based in Costa Rica. Many Miskito and other indigenous peoples from the isolated Atlantic coast region took up arms against the government after the FSLN tried to exert tight controls over their territory. Together, these opposition groups came to be known as contras, from the Spanish word for counterrevolutionaries. A The Contra War From 1981 the Reagan administration steadily increased its support for the contras, in part to block Nicaraguan aid to other Central American revolutionary movements, but largely as part of its global strategy of encouraging armed opposition to regimes it believed were pro-Communist. More than $300 million in aid, equipment, and training went to the contras from 1982 to 1990. The administration also instituted an embargo on trade with Nicaragua and blocked loans from many international financial institutions. These actions weakened Nicaragua's already fragile economy, while contra attacks damaged agriculture, trade, and the nation's infrastructure. As the conflict between the government and the contras spread, tens of thousands of Nicaraguans fled into exile, and even more were forced by the violence to abandon their homes and move to other areas of the country. The Sandinistas responded to the contra threat by building up their military forces, receiving arms from the USSR and Cuba, and, in 1983, instituting compulsory military service. Beginning in the mid-1980s, money and personnel were diverted from social and economic programs to concentrate on defense. Under a state of emergency, the government suspended some civil liberties and at times jailed political opponents and censored the press. Reagan's support for the contras created a major political dispute in the United States. The contras were strongly influenced by former National Guard members and other Somoza supporters and were accused of widespread human-rights abuses against Nicaraguan civilians. When the U.S. Congress restricted and then banned aid to the contra rebels, the Reagan administration sought other ways to provide money secretly to the contras. This became a major part of the Iran-Contra Affair, a scandal during 1985 and 1986 that involved high-ranking members of the administration in illegal arms deals. Nicaragua also accused the United States of violating international law by its actions, which included CIA involvement in mining Nicaraguan harbors. In 1986 the International Court of Justice ruled in Nicaragua's favor, stating that the United States acted illegally by supporting the contras and mining Nicaragua's waters. B Peace Negotiations Despite the spreading conflict, Nicaragua held elections in November 1984. Much of the opposition boycotted the elections, claiming the Sandinistas were manipulating the process. In the voting for president and members of congress, the Sandinistas won an overwhelming victory. Daniel Ortega became president with 67 percent of the vote, and the FSLN won a majority of seats in the National Assembly, with opposition parties taking 35 of the 96 seats. For many foreign countries, the elections made the FSLN government more legitimate, but they did nothing to lessen the hostility of the Reagan administration or resolve the issues that fueled the contra war. By 1987 there were more than 10,000 armed contras fighting the Nicaraguan government. Despite concerns about Sandinista policies, most Latin American nations opposed U.S. attempts to overthrow the Nicaraguan government. Fearing that the conflict could lead to a regional war or U.S. military intervention, Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, and Panama formed the Contadora Group in 1983 to mediate the conflict. However, their efforts had little success. In 1987 Costa Rican president Oscar Arias Sánchez led an effort of Central American presidents to end the conflicts in both Nicaragua and El Salvador. This peace plan resulted in negotiations between the FSLN and the contras in 1988. Pressures to end the war were growing. Nicaragua's economy was in ruins, with inflation estimated at 2000 to 36,000 percent in 1988, and the country had become Central America's poorest nation. The human cost of the war was appalling, with tens of thousands of people killed and wounded, and many more made refugees. The Sandinistas' ambitious programs of health care and education were deteriorating as about half the government's budget went to the military. Agriculture was damaged by contra attacks, natural disasters, and failed Sandinista policies, which cut production of both food and export crops needed to bring in revenue. The international climate had also changed. The USSR was dealing with political and economic upheaval at home, forcing it to reduce its support for the Sandinistas. At the same time, the Iran-Contra scandals and the inauguration of George Bush as president made the United States more willing to find a negotiated solution to the conflict. As part of peace negotiations, the Sandinistas agreed to hold elections under international supervision in early 1990. The Sandinistas believed they would win, with Daniel Ortega seeking reelection as president. Fourteen opposition parties created the National Opposition Union (UNO), which supported the presidential candidacy of Violeta Chamorro and offered a unified slate of congressional candidates. Appealing to widespread opposition to the military draft and to hopes for peace, the UNO coalition won, receiving 55 percent of the vote compared to 41 percent for the Sandinistas. After some debate and negotiations, the FSLN accepted its unexpected defeat. The Sandinistas changed roles and became the major opposition political party. They retained not only the largest bloc of members in the National Assembly, but also the majority of seats on the Supreme Court and command of the armed forces. The party also kept control of many labor unions and a wide variety of other organizations. This meant that the Sandinistas had the power to block or limit actions by the new government and force it to make concessions on economic and other policies. Before handing over power, many Sandinista officials also transferred houses and other confiscated property to themselves and the party, leading to charges of corruption. The Chamorro administration attempted to work with the Sandinistas, but efforts at compromise angered more conservative groups and caused the breakup of the UNO coalition. The FSLN retained considerable political influence, but in 1996 elections the party again lost the presidential race and won fewer seats in the congress. VI LEGACY OF THE REVOLUTION The revolution produced some profound and lasting changes in Nicaragua. The Somoza dynasty, which had ruled Nicaragua as its private estate for 40 years, was overthrown, and the powerful National Guard was destroyed. Literacy levels rose significantly, and youth, women, and the rural poor took a more active part in national life than ever before. The Miskito regions of the Atlantic coast achieved limited self-rule. After decades of dictatorship and civil war, a democratic government emerged, allowing the first consecutive, peaceful transitions of power between elected officials in Nicaragua's history. But the Sandinistas had a larger goal: to change the structure of Nicaraguan society and improve the lives of the poorest citizens. They had declared that all Nicaraguans had a right to food, shelter, education, and health care. But their ambitious health, education, and other programs, though initially successful, had few lasting results. By the 1990s literacy rates had fallen, though they were still higher than under Somoza, and health and nutritional levels actually declined from prerevolution levels. Efforts to change the economy, through a combination of private enterprise and socialist-style, central-government controls, led to disaster. Agricultural production, needed both to feed Nicaragua's people and to provide crops to sell, declined. Sandinista confiscation of property created uncertainty over ownership rights, discouraging investors into the 1990s. Nicaraguans and outside observers have sharply debated to what extent the economic crisis and the failure to improve living conditions resulted from the Sandinistas' Marxist ideology and flawed economic policies, and to what extent they were caused by U.S. opposition and the contra war. Nicaragua was changed fundamentally by the experience of the revolution, becoming a freer but poorer and deeply divided nation. More than six years after the Sandinistas were voted out of power, the nation continued to struggle toward economic recovery and national reconciliation from the turmoil of the 1980s. Contributed By: Richard L. 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