Cuban Missile Crisis - U.

« inspect ships to determine whether they were carrying weapons.

Kennedy warned that if Khrushchev fired missiles from Cuba, the result would be “a full retaliatoryresponse upon the Soviet Union.” Because international law defines a blockade as an act of war, Kennedy and his advisers decided to refer to the blockade as a quarantine.

The United States wassupported by other members of the Organization of American States, an organization of nations in the western hemisphere that seek to cooperate on matters ofsecurity and economic and social development. V WAITING FOR WAR The first days after the speech were consumed with tension as Kennedy waited to see whether the Soviet ships would respect the blockade or trigger a militaryconfrontation at sea.

For several tense days Soviet vessels en route to Cuba avoided the quarantine zone, and Khrushchev and Kennedy communicated throughdiplomatic channels.

This cautious action postponed any confrontation between the U.S.

Navy and the Soviet freighters or the Soviet submarines escorting them. On October 26 Khrushchev sent a coded cable to Kennedy that seemingly offered to withdraw missiles from Cuba in return for a U.S.

pledge not to invade the island, apledge Kennedy had already volunteered more than a week earlier during a meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko.

Before Kennedy and his adviserscould react, Khrushchev delivered a public message in which he linked the withdrawal of the Cuban missiles to the removal of “analogous” U.S.

weapons in Turkey alongthe southern border of the USSR.

Khrushchev may have been emboldened to make this added demand by the fact that the United States allowed some Soviet-blocships to pass through the blockade.

None of Kennedy's top advisers valued the U.S.

missiles in Turkey, which were considered obsolete.

However, nearly all of themcounseled against removing the missiles in response to a Soviet demand, a demand they thought was made in bad faith to derail any solution. Meanwhile the United States faced the difficult problems of maintaining the blockade and keeping track of the Soviet missiles, which were camouflaged and moved soonafter Kennedy's speech.

Low-flying U.S.

surveillance aircraft encountered hostile fire, and on October 27 the Cubans shot down a U-2, killing its pilot.

The Kennedyadministration debated the question of whether or not to retaliate by destroying some air defense sites in Cuba, but retaliation ran the risk of killing Soviet advisers andthereby escalating the crisis. Kennedy sensed that the U.S.

public would support removing the missiles in Turkey, but he did not want to appear to be capitulating to Khrushchev's demand.

FinallyKennedy decided his public reply would only address Khrushchev's first message, which offered to withdraw the missiles in exchange for a pledge not to invade Cuba. At the same time, however, Kennedy planned to privately assure Khrushchev that he intended to remove the missiles in Turkey.

The president’s brother, AttorneyGeneral Robert Kennedy, paid a secret visit to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., to convey the president's pledge and itsterms.

If the Soviets disclosed the assurance or intimated that the missiles in Turkey were part of the bargain, the missiles would not be withdrawn, Robert Kennedytold Dobrynin.

He also warned the Soviets that time was running out and that the president would soon feel compelled to attack Cuba. By the time he received Dobrynin’s report, however, Khrushchev had already decided to remove the missiles because the danger of nuclear war was too great.

Cubanleader Fidel Castro had sent Khrushchev a message saying Castro believed a U.S.

invasion was imminent and that Khrushchev should be ready to launch the missiles.Khrushchev decided that Kennedy was serious and that an air attack on Cuba and an invasion were at hand.

Khrushchev told his ministers that the missiles must bewithdrawn from Cuba in return only for a noninvasion pledge. VI RESOLUTION On October 28 the tension began to subside.

In a worldwide radio broadcast Khrushchev said he would remove “offensive” weapons from Cuba in return for a U.S.pledge not to invade.

He also called for United Nations (UN) inspectors to verify the process.

Kennedy believed Khrushchev was sincere, but many of Kennedy’s advisersremained wary of the Soviets' intentions. A further problem developed when Castro refused to allow UN oversight of the dismantling process.

Eventually an agreement was reached: The bombers would beremoved within 30 days, and the missiles and other “offensive” weapons would be evacuated in the open so that U.S.

surveillance aircraft could observe their removal. VII CONCLUSION In the years since the crisis, more details about the incident emerged from declassified U.S.

and Soviet files; from conferences involving those who participated in thecrisis, including some Soviet officials; and from the release of secretly recorded White House tapes of the meetings involving Kennedy and his advisers. The facts that came to light revealed that a U.S.

invasion of Cuba might have met more opposition than the United States expected.

Unknown to the U.S.

government,Soviet forces in Cuba had been equipped with nuclear weapons intended for battlefield use.

The United States had also incorrectly estimated the number of Soviettroops stationed in Cuba.

Instead of a few thousand troops, there were about 40,000 Soviet soldiers in Cuba.

Any U.S.

invasion would have faced stiff resistance. The Cuban missile crisis was a very dangerous episode, bringing the world’s major military powers to the brink of nuclear war.

Kennedy has been criticized for suchpolicies as the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, which helped cement the Soviet-Cuban relationship and led Khrushchev to think Kennedy might be bullied.

Yet most historiansagree that it was Kennedy's good judgment, and the prudence Khrushchev displayed once the crisis intensified, that helped avert catastrophe. The crisis led to a temporary strain in relations between the USSR and Cuba.

Castro felt he had been unfairly excluded from the negotiations over the fate of themissiles, which he thought Cuba needed to discourage a potential invasion from the United States.

However, with the threat of invasion removed by the U.S.

pledge andwith Cuba badly in need of Soviet financial aid, relations between Cuba and the USSR soon grew closer. The apparent capitulation of the USSR in the standoff was instrumental in Khrushchev's being deposed as leader of the USSR in 1964.

The younger Soviet leaders whoousted Khrushchev perceived his action during the crisis as weak and indecisive.

This perception, combined with other foreign policy setbacks and difficulties meeting hisgoals for domestic programs, contributed to his removal from power. The Cuban missile crisis marked the point at which the Cold War began to thaw.

Both sides had peered over the precipice of nuclear war and wisely decided to retreat.Khrushchev eventually accepted the status quo in West Berlin, and the predicted conflict there never materialized.

The thaw also led to the signing of the LimitedNuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963 by Britain, the United States, and the USSR.

The treaty outlawed nuclear test explosions in the atmosphere or underwater, but allowedthem underground. Microsoft ® Encarta ® 2009. © 1993-2008 Microsoft Corporation.

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