Confucian philosophy, Chinese

Chinese Confucian philosophy is primarily a set of ethical ideas oriented toward practice. Characteristically, it stresses the traditional boundaries of ethical responsibility and dao, or the ideal of the good human life as a whole. It may be characterized as an ethics of virtue in the light of its conception of dao and de (virtue). Comprising the conceptial framework of Confucian ethics are notions of basic virtues such as ren (benevolence), yi (rightness, righteousness), and li (rites, propriety). There are also notions of dependent virtues such as filiality, loyalty, respectfulness and integrity. Basic virtues are considered fundamental, leading or action-guiding, cardinal and the most comprehensive. In the classic Confucian sense, ren pertains to affectionate concern for the well-being of fellows in one's community. Notably, ren is often used in an extended sense by major Song and Ming Confucians as interchangeable with dao for the ideal of the universe as a moral community. Yi pertains to the sense of rightness, especially exercised in coping with changing circumstances of human life, those situations that fall outside the scope of li. Li focuses on rules of proper conduct, which have three functions: delimiting, supportive and ennobling. That is, the li define the boundaries of proper behaviour, provide opportunities for satisfying desires of moral agents within these boundaries, and encourage the development of noble characters which markedly embody cultural refinement and communal concerns. The li are the depository of insights of the Confucian tradition as a living ethical tradition. This tradition is subject to changing interpretation governed by the exercise of quan or the weighing of circumstances informed by the sense of rightness (yi). However, the common Confucian appeal to historical events and paradigmatic individuals is criticized because of lack of understanding of the ethical uses of such a historical appeal. The pedagogical use stresses the study of the classics in terms of the standards of ren, yi and li. Learning, however, is not a mere acquisition of knowledge, but requires understanding and insight. Also, the companion study of paradigmatic individuals is important, not only because they point to models of emulation but also because they are, so to speak, exemplary personifications of the spirits of ren, yi and li. Moreover, they also function as reminders of moral learning and conduct that appeal especially to what is deemed in the real interest of the learner. The rhetorical use of the historical appeal is basically an appeal to plausible presumptions, or shared beliefs and trustworthiness. These presumptions are subject to further challenge, but they can be accepted as starting points in discourse. The elucidative use of historical appeal purports to clarify the relevance of the past for the present. Perhaps most important for argumentative discourse is the evaluative function of historical appeal. It focuses our knowledge and understanding of our present problematic situations as a basis for exerting the unexamined claims based on the past as a guidance for the present. Thus, both the elucidative and evaluative uses of historical appeal are critical and attentive to evidential grounding of ethical claims. Because of its primary ethical orientation and its influence on traditional Chinese life and thought, Confucianism occupies a pre-eminent place in the history of Chinese philosophy. The core of Confucian thought lies in the teachings of Confucius (551-479 BC) contained in the Analects (Lunyu), along with the brilliant and divergent contributions of Mencius (372?-289 BC) and Xunzi (fl. 298-238 BC), as well as the Daxue (Great Learning) and the Zhongyong (Doctrine of the Mean), originally chapters in the Liji (Book of Rites). Significant and original developments, particularly along a quasi-metaphysical route, are to be found in the works of Zhou Dunyi (1017-73), Zhang Zai (1020-77), Cheng Hao (1032-85), Cheng Yi (1033-1107), Zhu Xi (1130-1200), Lu Xiangshan (1139-93), and Wang Yangming (1472-1529). Li Gou (1009-59), Wang Fuzhi (1619-92), and Dai Zhen (1723-77) have also made noteworthy contributions to the critical development of Confucian philosophy. In the twentieth century, the revitalization and transformation of Confucian philosophy has taken a new turn in response to Western philosophical traditions. Important advances have been made by Feng Youlan, Tang Junyi, Thomé H. Fang, and Mou Zongsan. Most of the recent works in critical reconstruction are marked by a self-conscious concern with analytic methodology and the relevance of existentialism, phenomenology, and hermeneutics. Still lacking is a comprehensive and systematic Confucian theory informed by both the history and the problems of Western philosophy. 1 The conceptual framework A student or scholar of moral philosophy, approaching the classical core of Confucian ethics for the first time, is likely to be faced with a major difficulty in the lack of systematic exposition of basic Confucian notions such as ren (benevolence), li (rites), and yi (rightness), and their interconnection. Unlike major Western philosophers, Confucian thinkers are not concerned with definitions. As William Theodore de Bary (1970: v) has pointed out, most Chinese thinkers are not interested in the definition and analysis of concepts: ‘generally, the more crucial or central the idea, the greater the ambiguity'. Instead, they are concerned with the expansive uses of ideas that suggest the widest possible range of meaning. From the point of view of contemporary moral philosophy, this pervasive feature of Confucian discourses may appear to be an anomaly, given the classical emphasis on the right use of terms (zhengming). A serious student of the works of Xunzi, the one classical Confucian generally considered to be the most rationalistic and systematic philosopher, will be frustrated in the attempt to find definitions, in the sense of necessary and sufficient conditions, for the application of basic Confucian terms. This fact is all the more surprising in view of Xunzi's recurrent employment of certain definitional locutions or quasi-definitional formulas for explaining his theses on human nature and the mind. Like most major Confucians, Xunzi has a pragmatic attitude toward the use of language, that is, the uses of terms that require explanation are those that are liable to misunderstanding in the context of particular discourse. The Confucian explanations of the use of ethical terms are context-dependent and are addressed to a particular rather than universal audience. Two different assumptions underlying this attitude toward language may account for the absence of Chinese interest in context-independent explanation of the use of ethical terms. First, there is an assumption of the primacy of practice implicit in the Confucian doctrine of the unity of knowledge and action (zhixing heyi). Definition, in the sense of meaning explanation, is a matter of practical rather than theoretical necessity. This assumption does not depreciate the importance of theoretical inquiry, but rather focuses on its relevance to the requirements of practice, particularly those that promote unity and harmony among people in the community. Such requirements vary in time and place. A viable ethical theory is thus subject to pragmatic assessment in the light of changing circumstances. In general, ethical requirements cannot be stated in terms of absolute or fixed principles or rules. It is this assumption of the primacy of practice that renders plausible Donald Munro's claim that the consideration important to the Chinese is the behavioural implications of the belief or proposition in question (Munro 1969). What effect does adherence to the belief have on people? What implications for social action can be drawn from the statement? In Confucianism, there was no thought of ‘knowing' that did not entail some consequence for action. Related to the primacy of practice is the assumption that reasoned discourse may legitimately appeal to what Nicholas Rescher calls ‘plausible presumptions,' that is, an appeal to shared knowledge, belief or experience, as well as to established or operative standards of discourse (Rescher 1977: 38). For Confucian thinkers, most of these presumptions, at least among the well-educated, represent the shared understanding of a common tradition and a living cultural heritage. These presumptions are often suppressed and mainly form the background of discourse. Thus Confucian reasoning and argumentation appears to be highly vague and inexplicit. From the Aristotelian point of view, Confucian reasoning is ‘rhetorical', as it frequently involves enthymemes and arguments from examples. Given the assumptions of the primacy of practice and appeal to plausible presumptions, any attempt at introducing Confucian ethics to students of Western philosophy involves a basic task in philosophical reconstruction. This is a task in constructive interpretation, not only in providing a general characterization but also in reshaping the basic notions and concerns of Confucian ethics in response to some problems of moral philosophy. Such an exploration serves two important and connected aims: first, a plausible explication of the Confucian outlook in philosophically relevant idioms, and second, a critical development of Confucian ethical thought. 2 An ethics of virtue: dao and de While major Confucianists (for example, Mencius and Xunzi) differ in their conceptions of human nature in relation to conduct, most of them accept Confucius' ideal of a well-ordered society based on good government ( Xing; Mencius; Xunzi). Good government is responsive to the basic needs of the people, to issues of wise management of natural resources and to just distribution of burdens and benefits. In this vision of socio-political order, special emphasis is put on harmonious human relationships (lun) in accord with de, virtues or standards of excellence. This vision is often called dao, a term that has been appropriated by different classical schools of Chinese thought, including Daoism and Legalism ( Legalist philosophy, Chinese; Daoist Philosophy). In the Analects, dao is sometimes used as a verb, meaning ‘to guide'; sometimes it is used as a concrete noun, meaning literally ‘road'. In the latter sense, it can be rendered as ‘way'. But in distinct Confucian ethical usage, as commonly acknowledged by commentators, it is dao as an abstract noun that is meant, and more especially in the evaluative rather than descriptive sense, that is, as referring to the ethical ideal of a good human life as a whole ( Dao). Throughout its long history, Confucianism has stressed character formation or personal cultivation of virtues (de) ( De). Thus it seems appropriate to characterize Confucian ethics as an ethics of virtue, not an ethics of rules or principles. To avoid misunderstanding, two explanations are in order. In the first place, the Confucian focus on the centrality of virtues assumes that the notion of de can be rendered as ‘virtue'. In the second place, this focus does not depreciate the importance of rule-governed conduct ( Moral development). Sinologists differ in their interpretation of the Confucian use of de. Some insist that de should be construed as ‘power', ‘force' or ‘potency', and in Confucian usage it should be qualified as moral in contrast to physical force. Others argue for ‘virtue' in the distinctively ethical sense, as pertaining to the excellence of a character trait or disposition. Interestingly, these two construals of de are not incompatible in the light of some English uses of ‘virtue' ( Virtue ethics). In Webster's Third New International Dictionary, for example, the sixth definition of ‘virtue' is: ‘an active quality or power whether of physical or of moral nature; the capacity or power adequate to the production of a given effect', and the fifth definition is: ‘a characteristic, quality, or trait known or felt to be excellent'. The Oxford English Dictionary likewise offers as definitions ‘a good quality' and ‘efficacy; inherent power'. Both these senses of ‘virtue' are found in the classical Chinese uses of de. There is, of course, the value-neutral sense of de that leaves open the question whether personal traits or qualities merit ethical approval, and this question is reflected in the distinction, still current in Modern Chinese, between meide and ede. The former pertains to ‘beautiful' or ‘commendable' de, and the latter to its contrary. Meide are those traits that are acquired through personal cultivation. The Encyclopedia Dictionary of the Chinese Language offers the following two entries for de in the ethical sense, one suggested by an interpretation of its homophone, meaning ‘to get' or ‘to obtain', found in the Liji (Book of Rites): ‘that which is obtained in the heart-and-mind as a result of personal cultivation', and ‘the nature that is formed after successful personal cultivation'. Both these definitions involve meide, commendable, acquired qualities or traits of character, much in the sense of David Hume's ‘personal merits' ( Hume, D.) Ede, on the other hand, are personal demerits or ‘detestable' qualities of character. Also important is the sense of de as power or force, in view of the Confucian notion of junzi (ethically superior or paradigmatic individuals). By virtue of ethical achievement, a junzi possesses the power of attraction or influence indicative of effective agency ( Moral agents). As Confucius remarks, the junzi, equipped with the virtues (de), never stands alone: ‘He is bound to have neighbours.' ‘The virtue (de) of the gentleman (junzi) is like the wind; the virtue (de) of the small man is like grass. Let the wind blow over the grass and it is sure to bend' (Analects 12.19, in Lau 1979: 115-16). In sum, the Confucian notion of de can be properly construed as ethical virtues that possess a dual aspect: an achieved condition of a person through self-cultivation of commendable character traits in accordance with the ideal dao, and a condition that is deemed to have the peculiar potency or power of efficacy in influencing the course of human life. The difficult problem is to present the Confucian dao and de as an ethics of virtue with a coherent conceptual scheme. 3 Basic notions and the problem of conceptual unity The Analects, a composite work, is commonly considered the main and most reliable source of Confucius' teachings ( Confucius). It bequeaths to the Chinese tradition a large and complex ethical vocabulary, which contains a significant number of virtue (de) terms with implicit reference to the Confucian ideal of dao. Terms such as ren (benevolence), yi (rightness) and li (rites) seem to occupy a central position both in the Analects and throughout the history of Confucian discourse. Until recent times, however, few philosophical scholars of Confucianism attended to the problem of conceptual explication and the unity of these basic notions, that is, their presumed interconnection or interdependence in the light of dao as an ideal, unifying perspective. While most Confucian terms for particular virtues can be rendered into English without the need of elaborate explanation - for example, xiao (filiality), yong (courage), wei (dignity), zhong (fidelity), ci (kindness), jing (respectfulness) - the apparently basic notions (ren, li and yi) are not amenable to the simple expedience of translation and thus pose a problem for conceptual analysis and interpretation. Moreover, existing translations of these terms ineluctably embody the writer's interpretation, a sort of implicit commentary, representing the writer's prior understanding of the translated texts. Similarly, an explication of basic Confucian notions involves philosophical commentary, a familiar feature in the development of the history of Chinese thought. However, attempts at explication have been beset by a formidable difficulty, especially in defining the basic concepts of the Confucian framework. The pioneering study of the conceptual aspect of Confucian ethics is Chen Daqi's Kongzi xueshuo (Teachings of Confucius) (Chen 1976). Chen reminds us that prior to interpreting the ideas of Confucius, it is essential to inquire into the conceptual status of some recurrent terms in the text. For determining the centrality or basic status of notions or concepts, Chen proposes four criteria, according to which basic concepts are (1) fundamental, (2) leading or guiding, (3) the most important (cardinal) or (4) the most comprehensive. Fundamental concepts suggest the distinction between basic and derivative concepts. However, it is more plausible and accords better with Chen's discussion to construe his distinction as one between basic and dependent concepts. Given our characterization of Confucian ethics as an ethics of virtues, this is a conceptual distinction between basic and dependent virtues. A concept may depend on another for its ethical significance without being a logical derivation. For instance, one cannot derive the concept of love from ren, yet its ethical significance depends on its connection with ren. This is perhaps the principal ground for Zhu Xi's famous contention that ren cannot be equated with love, for it is the rationale of love (ai zhi li) ( Zhu Xi). Leading or guiding concepts recall the purport of ethical terms as guides for action, informing the Confucian agent that the enduring significance of ethical endeavours lies in the pursuit of dao or the ideal of the good human life as a whole. Cardinal concepts and comprehensive concepts are the chief mark of basic ethical concepts. Comprehensive concepts also raise an issue in Confucian scholarship. Perhaps the issue can be settled if comprehensiveness is ascribed to dao or ren in the broad sense as signifying the holistic, ideal unifying perspective of Confucian discourse. Again, consider Zhu Xi's thesis that ren (in the broad sense) embraces the four: ren (in the narrow sense), yi (rightness), li (rites) and zhi (wisdom). In terms of an ethics of virtue, the fundamental distinction is the distinction between cardinal and dependent virtues. Accordingly, Chen proposes that in addition to dao and de, the Confucian scheme consists of ren, li and yi as the basic, cardinal concepts. This thesis is well-supported by the recurrence of such concepts and their fundamental importance throughout the history of Confucianism. 4 The ethical framework of Confucianism The foregoing pertains to the question of identifying basic, cardinal concepts as contrasted with dependent concepts. A more formidable problem remains as to how these basic concepts are related to one another. The following discussion presents a sketch of a philosophical reconstruction, which is essentially a conceptual experiment. The sketch offers a general characterization of Confucian ethics as a form of virtue ethics, and provides a sample of how such basic notions as li and yi can be shaped in response to questions deemed important for the development of a Confucian moral philosophy. The Confucian ethical framework comprises the five basic concepts: dao, de, ren, yi and li. The best initial approach is to regard these, with a minimum of interpretation, as ‘focal notions', that is, terms that function like focal lenses for conveying distinct though not unrelated centres of ethical concern. As generic terms, focal notions are amenable to specification in particular contexts, thus acquiring specific or narrower senses. This distinction is an adaptation of Xunzi's distinction between generic terms (gongming) and specific terms (bieming). However, a term used as a specific term in one context may in another context be used as a generic term subject to further specification. In other words, the use of a term in either the generic or specific sense is entirely relative to the speaker's purpose on a particular occasion, rather than to any theory concerning the intrinsic characters of terms or the essential attributes of things. As noted earlier, dao is an evaluative term. Its focal point of interest lies in the Confucian vision of the good human life as a whole or the ideal of human excellence. Commonly rendered as ‘the way', dao is functionally equivalent to the ideal ‘way of life'. Unlike other basic terms, dao is most distinctive as an abstract, formal term in the highest generic sense, that is, subject to general specification by way of such virtue (de) words as ren, li and yi. As de is an individual achievement through personal cultivation, when a person succeeds in realizing dao, they have attained such basic de as ren, li and yi. The specification of de, apart from ren, li and yi, can take a variety of forms or dependent virtues such as filiality, respectfulness or trustworthiness. In this sense, de is an abstract noun like dao, but it depends on dao for its distinctive character. De is thus functionally equivalent to ethical virtue. Thus, the opening remark of the Daxue (Great Learning) points out that the way of great learning or adult, ethical education lies in the clear exemplification of the virtues (ming mingde) ( Daxue; Moral education; Moral development). With its emphasis on dao and de, Confucian ethics is properly characterized as an ethics of virtue, but more informatively as an ethics of ren, li and yi, relative to their concrete specification or particularization by terms of dependent virtues (for example, filiality, respectfulness, integrity). As generic, focal terms, ren, li and yi are specific terms relative to dao as a generic term. Differently put, implicit in Chen's account is a distinction between basic, interdependent virtues (ren, li and yi) and dependent virtues (filiality, respectfulness and so on) (Chen 1976). As indicated earlier, the latter are dependent in the sense that their ethical import depends on direct or indirect reference to one or more of the basic, interdependent virtues of ren, li and yi ( Virtue ethics). 5 Ren While ren, commonly translated as ‘benevolence', has a long history of conceptual evolution and interpretation, as a focal notion it centres its ethical interest on love and care for one's fellows, that is, an affectionate concern for the well-being of others - the one persistent idea in the Confucian tradition. For this reason, English translators often render ren as ‘benevolence', suggestive of the use of ‘benevolence' in Francis Hutcheson and David Hume. Perhaps a more literal translation of ren, however, is ‘human-heartedness' or ‘humanity', since ren is basically an idea of love or concern for the well-being of human community, a specification of the concrete significance of the Confucian dao ( Community and communitarianism §1). This core meaning of ren as fellow-feeling is found in the Analects; it is reported that Confucius once said to his disciple Zengzi, ‘My dao has one thread that runs through it.' Zengzi construed this dao to consist of zhong and shu, an interpretation widely acknowledged as a method for pursuing ren (Analects 4.15, in Lau 1979: 74) While the relation betweenzhong and shu has divergent interpretations, zhong may be rendered as ‘doing one's best', and shu as ‘consideration' (of other people's feelings and desires). In this light, Confucian ethics displays a concern for both self-regarding and other-regarding virtues. However, the acquisition of these virtues presupposes a locus in which these particular, dependent virtues are exercised. Thus among the dependent virtues, filiality, brotherhood or sisterhood are primary, for the family is the natural home and the foundation for the extension of ren-affection. Thus friendship is viewed as a fundamental human relationship along with those of husband-wife and parent-child. In Song and Ming Confucianism (for example, in Cheng Hao and Wang Yangming), dao is sometimes used interchangeably with ren. In this manner, ren attained the status of a supreme, all-embracing ethical ideal of the well-being of every existent thing, human or non-human, animate or inanimate. Confucius' vision of a well-ordered human society is transformed into the vision of the universe as a moral community. In this conception, anything that is an actual or potential object of human attention is considered an object of human concern. Exploitation of human and natural resources must be subject to evaluation in terms of dao as an all embracing ethical ideal of existence. This ideal of dao makes no specific demands on ordinary humans. For the most part, conflict of values is left to individual determination, though the welfare of the parents is always the first consideration. Thus, the concrete significance of dao is open to the exercise of yi, the agent's sense of rightness. 6 Yi and li The exercise of yi, usually rendered as righteousness or rightness, depends on ethical education based on daotong or the tradition of the community of interpretation; that is, the reasoned interpretation of the educated members of the community informed by sensus communis, a sense of common interest, a regard for dao as the ideal unifying perspective. Disagreement or dispute on the pragmatic import of dao is expected, as members of the community of interpretation have their own conceptions of human excellence (shan) and possibilities of fulfilment. The ethical solution of conflict of interpretation lies in transforming the disagreement into agreement in the light of sensus communis, not in a solution defined by agonistic debate which presumes that there are impartial judges who can render their corporate decision in terms of majority vote. Unlike contemporary democratic polity, the majority rule cannot be reasonably accepted as a standard for setting ethical disagreement. The ethical tradition provides the background and guidelines to ethical conduct. Normative ethical theories have value because they provide different ways of assessing the significance of tradition. Like the basic concepts of Confucian ethics, they are focal notions for important centres of ethical concern, for example, duty and interest (private or public), or in recent terminology, agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons for action ( Moral agents). The notion of li focuses on the ritual code ( Law and ritual in Chinese philosophy). For this reason, it is commonly rendered as ‘rites', ‘ritual', ‘propriety', or ‘ceremonials'. The ritual code is essentially a set of rules of proper conduct pertaining to the manner or style of performance. As yi is incompatible with exclusive regard for personal gain, the li set forth the rules of ethical responsibility. For Confucius and his followers, the li represent an enlightened tradition. As D.C. Lau has put it: The rites (li) were a body of rules governing action in every aspect of life and they were the repository of past insights into morality. It is, therefore, important that one should, unless there are strong reasons to the contrary, observe them. Though there is no guarantee that observance of the rites necessarily leads, in every case, to behaviour that is right, the chances are it will, in fact, do so. (Lau 1979: 20) Yet, the ethical significance of li is determined by the presence of the spirit of ren. As Confucius once said, ‘If a man has no ren, what has he to do with li?' (Analects 3.3, in Lau 1979: 67). Since the ritual code represents a customary practice, the early Confucians, particularly Xunzi and the writers of some chapters in the Liji, were concerned with providing a reasoned justification for compliance with li or traditional rules of proper conduct. As Arthur Waley aptly remarks: ‘it was with the relation of ritual [li] as a whole to morality and not with the details of etiquette and precedence that the early Confucianists were chiefly concerned' (Waley 1938: 67) The same concern with reasoned justification is evident in Song and Ming Confucianists (for example, Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming) who maintain that the significance of li (ritual) lies in its rationale (li zhi li). The ethical significance of yi, in part, is an attempt to provide a rationale for the acceptance of li. Yi focuses principally on what is right or fitting. The equation of yi with its homophone meaning ‘appropriateness' is explicit in the Zhongyong, 20 ( Zhongyong), and is generally accepted by Confucianists (for example, Xunzi, Li Gou and Zhu Xi). However, what is right or fitting depends on reasoned judgement. As Xunzi observes: ‘The person concerned with yi follows reason' (Xunzi XV, in Li 1979: 328) Thus, yi may be construed as reasoned judgement concerning the right thing to do in particular exigencies. Li Gou, a Song Confucian, justly reminds his readers that yi is ‘decisive judgement' that is appropriate to the situation at hand. In light of the foregoing, the interdependence of basic notions may be stated as follows. Given dao as the ideal of the good human life as a whole, ren, li and yi, the basic Confucian virtues (de), are constitutive rather than mere instrumental means to its actualization. In other words, the actualization of dao requires the co-satisfaction of the standards expressed in ren, li and yi. Since these focal notions pertain to different foci of ethical interest, we may also say that the actualization of dao requires a coordination of three equally important centres of ethical interest and endeavour. The connection between these foci is one of interdependence rather than subordination. Thus in the ideal case, ren, li and yi are mutually supportive and adherent to the same ideal of dao. When dao is in fact realized, ren, li and yi would be deemed constituents of this condition of achievement. When, on the other hand, one attends to the prospect of dao-realization, ren, li and yi would be regarded as complementary foci and means to dao as an end. In sum, ren, li and yi are complementary foci of human interest. 7 The scope and functions of li Because of its distinctive character and role in Confucian ethics and its pervasive influence in traditional China and contemporary critique, the notion of li requires special attention ( Law and ritual in Chinese philosophy). Implicit in the notion of li is an idea of rule-governed conduct. In the Liji (Book of Rites), the subject matter ranges from ritual rules (or formal prescriptions) concerning mourning, sacrifices, marriage and communal festivities to the more ordinary occasions relating to conduct towards ruler, superior, parent, elder, teacher and guest. Because of its emphasis on the form or manner of behaviour, li is often translated as ‘religious rites', ‘ceremony', ‘deportment', ‘decorum', ‘propriety', ‘formality', ‘politeness', ‘courtesy', ‘etiquette', ‘good form' or ‘good behaviour'. These renderings are misleading without understanding the different functions of li. At the outset, it is important to note that for Confucians the li are an embodiment of a living cultural tradition; that is, they are subject to modification in response to changing circumstances of society. Thus some writers of the Liji point out that the li are the prescriptions of reason, and that any ritual rule that is deemed right and reasonable (yi) can be considered a part of li. On one plausible interpretation, the traditional ritual code represents no more than a codification of ethical experiences based on the concern with ren and yi. In this light, the li are in principle subject to revision or replacement. In the spirit of Zhu Xi, we may say that a Confucian must reject ritual rules that are burdensome and superfluous and accept those that are practicable and essential to the maintenance of a harmonious social order. However, any reasoned attempt to revise or replace li presupposes an understanding of their functions. It is this understanding that distinguishes the Confucian scholar from a pedant, who may have a mastery of rules without understanding their underlying rationales. For elucidation, we rely mainly on a reconstruction of Xunzi's view, since we find in some of his essays the most articulate concern for and defence of li as an embodiment of a living, cultural tradition ( Xunzi). With regard to any system of rules governing human conduct, one can always raise questions concerning its purpose. In Confucian ethics, the li, as a set of formal prescriptions for proper behaviour, have a threefold function: delimiting, supportive and ennobling. The delimiting function is primary, in that the li are fundamentally directed to the prevention of human conflict. They comprise a set of constraints that delineate the boundaries of pursuit of individual needs, desires and interests. The li purport to set forth rules of proceeding in an orderly fashion, ultimately to promote the unity and harmony of human association in a state ruled by a sage king imbued with the spirit of ren and yi. This orderliness consists of social distinctions or divisions in various kinds of human relationships (lun), namely, the distinctions between ruler and minister, father and son, the eminent and the humble, the elder and the younger, the rich and the poor, and the important and unimportant members of society. In abstraction from the connection with ren and yi, the delimiting function of li may be compared to that of negative moral rules or criminal laws. Like rules against killing, stealing or lying, the li impose constraints on conduct. They create paths of obstruction, thus blocking certain moves of agents in the pursuit of their desires or interests. The li, in effect, stipulate the conditions of eligibility or permissibility of actions. They do not prejudge the substantive character or value of individual pursuit. They provide information on the limiting conditions of action, but no positive guidance as to how one's desires may be properly satisfied. Put differently, the li tell agents what goals not to pursue, but they do not tell them how to go about pursuing goals within the prescribed limits of action. Apart from the delimiting function, the li have also a supportive function; that is, they provide conditions or opportunities for satisfaction of desires within the prescribed limits of action. Instead of suppressing desires, the li provide acceptable channels or outlets for their fulfilment. In an important sense, the supportive function of li acknowledges the integrity of our natural desires. So long as they are satisfied within the bounds of propriety, we accept them for what they are whether reasonable or unreasonable, wise or foolish, good or bad. The main supportive function of li is the redirection of the course of individual self-seeking activities, not the suppression of motivating desires. Just as the delimiting function of li may be compared with that of criminal law, their supportive function may be compared with that of procedural law, which contains rules that enable us to carry out our wishes and desires (for example, the law of wills and contracts). The li, like these procedural rules, aid the realization of desires without pronouncing value judgments. The focus on the ennobling function of li is a distinctive feature of Confucian ethics and traditional Chinese culture ( Self-cultivation, Chinese theories of). The keynote of the ennobling function is ‘cultural refinement', the education and nourishment (yang) of emotions or their transformation in accord with the spirit of ren and yi. The characteristic concern with the form of proper behaviour is still present. However, the form stressed is not just a matter of fitting into an established social structure or set of distinctions, nor is it a matter of methodical procedure that facilitates the satisfaction of the agent's desires and wishes; rather, it involves the elegant form (wen) for the expression of ethical character. In other words, the ennobling function of li is directed primarily to the development of commendable or beautiful virtues (meide). The ‘beauty' (mei) of the expression of an ethical character lies in the balance between emotions and form. What is deemed admirable in the virtuous conduct of an ethically superior person (junzi) is the harmonious fusion of elegant form and feelings. In the ideal case, a li-performance may be said to have an aesthetic dimension. In two different and related ways, a li-performance may be said to be an object of delight. In the first place, the elegant form is something that delights our senses. It can be contemplated with delight quite apart from the expressed emotional quality. In the second place, when we attend to the emotion or emotional quality expressed by the action, which we perceive as a sign of an ethical virtue or character, our mind is delighted and exalted, presuming of course that we are also agents interested in the promotion of ethical virtues in general. Respect for traditional rites of mourning and sacrifices is an expression for the concern with ren and li, because such practices exemplify the Confucian ideal of humanity; it is a sort of religious concern without endorsing any religious beliefs and practices. 8 The Confucian tradition If the set of li, or rules of proper conduct, is viewed as a repository of traditional insights, a question then arises concerning the Confucians' conception of their own tradition. Like other enduring ethical or religious traditions which extend across history (such as Buddhism or Christianity), the Confucian or Ru tradition, as embodied in the notion of daotong, has often been the target of the contemporary critique. According to one familiar appraisal, the Ru tradition is out of tune with our times. Like any cherished cultural artefact, it is best revered as a relic of the past. Moreover, many adherents of the Confucian tradition are dogmatic; they are unwilling to accept reasonable proposal for change or modification of some components of the tradition. Replying to this charge, a Confucian thinker or scholar might point out that, to a certain extent, the critique is reasonable. Throughout its long history, there is a recurrent tendency of many adherents of the Confucian tradition to institute orthodoxy and uphold their perceived values of the tradition as the true values of the tradition, indifferent to the distinction between perceived and real values. A personal ascription of value to an object cannot be logically equated with the value inherent in the object. Understanding a living tradition requires an appreciation of the distinction between the actual past and the perceived past, and the distinction between a living, robust tradition and a dying, decaying tradition. In the words of Jaroslav Pelikan, ‘Tradition is the living faith of the dead, traditionalism is the dead faith of the living' (Pelikan 1984: 65). Confucianism, in the words of Thomé Fang, is ‘a constructive philosophy of comprehensive harmony invested with creative energies of life' (Fang 1981: 33). Although this is a summary statement of the outcome of Fang's metaphysical inquiry, it is an apt characterization of the vitality of the Confucian dao or way as an ethical vision of the good human life, an ideal amenable to varying interpretations of its concrete significance in different times and places. Dao is an ideal theme rather than an ideal norm or supreme principle of conduct (Cua 1978, ch. 8). It is fundamentally a unifying perspective for harmonizing the diverse elements of moral experience. To adopt the dao is to see human life, in its morally excellent form, as possessing a coherence in which apparently conflicting elements are viewed as eligible components of an achievable harmonious order (Cua 1982, ch. 3). It is this vision of dao that renders intelligible the idea of a Confucian ethical tradition as a living tradition enriched by its historic past, interpreted by adherents as having a present and prospective significance ( Dao). 9 Xunzi and Zhu Xi Xunzi and Zhu Xi are perhaps the most articulate proponents of the importance of learning the classics as an indispensable means to inculcating a respect for the historical aspect of tradition. Xunzi points out that learning is an unceasing process of accumulation of goodness, knowledge, and practical understanding: ‘If an ethically superior person (junzi) studies widely and daily engages in self-examination, his intellect will become enlightened and his conduct be without fault.' In general, the programme of learning ‘commences with the recitation of the classics and ends with the study of li (rituals)'. Its purpose, however, is ‘first to learn to become a scholar and ultimately to become a sage'. The classics are presumed to embody the concrete significance of dao. For example, ‘the Odes give expression to the will (zhi) or determination [to realize dao]; the History or Book of Documents to its significance in human affairs; the Li or Rites to its significance in conduct; the Music to its significance in promoting harmony; and the Spring and Autumn Annals to its subtleties.' Notably, these classics are not self-explanatory, thus guidance from perceptive teachers is required. For example, ‘the Li and Music present us with models, but no explanations; the Odes and the History deal with ancient matters and are not always pertinent; the Spring and Autumn Annals are terse and cannot be quickly understood' (Xunzi I, in Li 1979: 2-14; trans. in Watson 1963: 15-20). Indeed, for Confucius as for Mencius and Xunzi, the li represent an ethical and cultural tradition ( Confucius). Learning to be a moral agent consists in part in appreciating ‘the accumulated wisdom of the past'. Compliance with li as a set of formal prescriptions of proper behaviour without regard to ren and particular circumstances would be deemed unreasonable. It is perhaps for this reason that Confucius stresses yi (a sense of rightness) rather than preconceived opinions in coping with novel and exigent situations. Mencius is emphatic that the relevance of a li-requirement must be considered in the light of weighing (quan) particular circumstances. In a similar spirit, Xunzi emphasizes the exercise of yi in responding to changing circumstances of human life. In general, the enforcement of laws and other rules of conduct depends on superior or exemplary persons (junzi) who have not only a knowledge of the subject matter but also an understanding of their underlying purposes, in addition to having a sense of priority and an ability to respond appropriately to changing affairs. Learning to become a sage (shengren) must begin with the study of the classics with a view to discerning their actuating significance in living contexts ( Chinese Classics). The Confucian respect for the authority of the past in relation to the present requires not only a critical understanding of the practical significance of the classics but, more importantly, a critical assessment of the ethical character and achievement of contemporary adherents of the tradition. Thus Xunzi urges his readers to distinguish common people from three sorts of Confucians (Ru): the vulgar or conventional (suru), the refined or cultured (yaru) and the great or sagely Confucians (daru). This distinction between three types of Confucians may be seen to be motivated by Xunzi's desire to respond to the internal challenges within the Confucian tradition - a reminder and a warning to his fellow Confucians against uncritical intellectual and practical affiliation (Xunzi VIII, in Li 1979). His critique of Mencius on the relation between morality and human nature is a well-known illustration of an internal conflict between different interpretations of a key aspect of Confucian ethical tradition. Like Mencius, Xunzi is also quite aware of the need to engage in argumentation to answer external challenges to the Confucian tradition (Xunzi XXIII, in Li 1979). For Mencius, there was no alternative but to engage in disputation since the dao of the sages, embodied in Yao and Shun, had in his own time been obscured by the prevailing teachings of Yang Zhu and Mozi. In a similar spirit, Xunzi attacks the views of a number of philosophers, for example, Mozi, Hui Shi, Songzi and Shen Dao, as well as Laozi and Zhuangzi. Xunzi considers most of their doctrines pernicious because, though often presented in elegant language and composition, they also present erroneous conceptions of the distinction between right and wrong and between order and disorder. However, it is noteworthy that Xunzi's critique explicitly acknowledges that ‘some of what they advocate has a reasoned basis, and thus their statements appear plausible' (Xunzi VI, in Li 1979: 94). In the light of his holistic conception of dao, many philosophical views are unacceptable not because they are totally erroneous, but because they grasp only partial aspects of dao and exaggerate these at the expense of other aspects. In sum, in Xunzi we find a Confucian philosopher who exemplifies a concern with defending the Confucian tradition against both internal and external challenges, and who is at the same time quite capable of critical adoption of non-Confucian views which he deems reasonably acceptable. Zhu Xi's conception of the Confucian tradition, daotong, commonly rendered as ‘transmission of dao', is a conception central to the orthodox tradition of neo-Confucianism ( Neo-Confucian philosophy). Because of its religious connotation, the notion of orthodoxy quite naturally suggests an uncritical adherence to conventional or currently accepted beliefs as possessing an unquestioned authoritative status. As de Bary has instructively shown, however, daotong is better construed as ‘repossession of dao' or ‘reconstitution of dao', recalling Pelikan's distinction between a living tradition and traditionalism (de Bary 1981: 2). As Tu Wei-ming remarks, Zhu Xi's study of the classics represents ‘serious efforts to revitalize the tradition [which] involved creative adaptation as well as faithful interpretations' (Tu 1979: 134). For example, in his detailed recommendations of classics for examinations, apart from some commentaries, Zhu Xi stresses the self-critical study of original texts: ‘In studying the classics one must have regard for the considered views of former scholars and extrapolate from them, aware that they are not necessarily conclusive but must be weighed as to what they understood and what they missed; then finally all this must be reflected upon in one's own mind to verify it' (Zhuzi yulei 3:37, in Li 1962, 1638-42). Zhu Xi also recommends non-orthodox philosophers of early China such as Xunzi, Han Feizi, Laozi ( Daodejing) and Zhuangzi. De Bary rightly reminds us that Zhu Xi's notion of daotong should not be construed in a manner that suggests a passive reception and transmission of the Confucian Way, for it involves an activity of revitalization and rediscovery as well as recovery of the meaning of the tradition or, in contemporary language, an activity of constructive or reconstructive interpretation of the tradition: ‘In fact, Chu Hsi [Zhu Xi] emphasized the discontinuities in the tradition almost more than the continuities, and underscored the contributions of inspired individuals who rediscovered or "clarified" the Way in new forms' (de Bary 1981: 99). Both Xunzi and Zhu Xi emphasize the role of inspired and insightful persons regarding classical learning. This emphasis somewhat echoes Confucius' notion of junzi or paradigmatic individuals, that is, persons, who through their life and conduct embody ren, li, yi and other ethical excellences ( §2). The junzi are the exemplars of the actuating significance of the Confucian tradition, serving as standards of inspiration for committed agents. These paradigmatic individuals are generally ascribed an authority by their contemporary adherents. The authority, however, is based on the acknowledgement of their superior knowledge and achievement, and especially their exercise of yi in interpretive judgements concerning the relevance of rules in exigent situations, or in Xunzi's words, on dao and de (virtue). However, while possessed of an authoritative ethical status, as standard bearers and interpreters of culture the junzi are not arbiters of moral disputes, for their interpretations of the Confucian tradition represent individual efforts toward the repossession or reconstitution of dao, thus essentially contestable and subject to reasoned assessment of their contemporaries and posterity. Implicit in the foregoing characterization of the Confucian tradition as a living tradition is the notion of tradition as an interpretive concept. For the most part, major Confucian philosophers stress the importance of classical education and the role of teachers as junzi or paradigmatic individuals, because they are thought to exemplify the best spirit of Confucius. Notably, Confucius' conception of junzi focuses on some salient characteristics. In addition to their pursuit of dao, the concern with ren, li and yi, they are also persons of integrity, catholicity and neutrality. The integrity is exemplified in their unwavering concern with the harmony of words and deeds (Cua 1978, ch. 5). This stress on the role of junzi as a guiding standard of education and moral conduct naturally gives rise to the question on the possibility of modification and transformation of the Confucian tradition. Indeed, if tradition is an interpretive concept, some account must be given on how changes may be viewed as consistent with the conservation of tradition. 10 Transformation of the Confucian tradition In the Confucian context, this problem of transformation of the tradition is best considered in terms of the distinction and connection between jing (the standard) and quan (the weighing of circumstances). The former pertains to the operative, established standards of conduct, the latter to the specific circumstances. Quan may be regarded as jing prior to the determination of its significance in actual, particular situations. In other words, jing, the established standards of conduct, depend on quan in the sense that their application is undetermined prior to actual circumstances. When such a determination is made, quan would become part of jing, given the assumption that the judgments are accepted by the Confucian community of interpretation. Concisely put, jing is the determinate quan, and quan is the indeterminate jing. Of course, both represent the constant (chang) and the changing (bian) aspects of dao. More importantly, the exercise of quan entails a concern with yi or rightness of judgement. Right judgement is necessary not only in dealing with the hard cases of the moral life, but also with normal situations (jing) where the intelligent adherent of the tradition confronts the problem of interpretation and application. In both sorts of situation the agent has the same moral objective, that is, to do the right thing. This is perhaps the point of Zhu Xi's saying that quan is unavoidably exercised in changing situations that fall outside the scope of the regular practice of daoli (moral norm): When quan attains equilibrium (zhong), it does not differ from jing', that is, they have achieved the same moral objective. In both cases they are governed by the exercise of yi or one's sense of rightness. For Zhu Xi, yi constitutes the guan, the thread that runs though jing and quan. (Zhuzi yulei 3:37, in Li 1962, 1638-42) The foregoing reflections on the distinction and connection between jing and quan afford us an answer to the question of the possibility of change or modification of the Confucian tradition of dao. Intelligent adherents of the Confucian tradition can deploy the sceptical challenge without fear of the corruption of the tradition ( Moral scepticism). The dynamic interplay of jing and quan in relation to constancy (chang) and change (bian) shows that the distinction is not a fixed or absolute distinction. As Dai Zhen points out, what is deemed important or unimportant in our assessment will vary in different times and places (Dai 1777 [1975]: 125). Put differently, the substantive content of the tradition of dao cannot be considered settled without prejudging the merits of particular circumstances. The exercise of quan in any situation requires a careful examination and analysis of all the relevant factors involved. Quite naturally, one may raise the question of justification for such judgements in exigent circumstances. In normal situations, the li are quite sufficient for action guidance insofar as they are informed by a concern for ren. The problem of reasoned justification for such judgments has not received attention from most Confucian thinkers, except Xunzi. However, even in the works of Xunzi we do not find any articulate answer to this problem, though his works do provide materials for constructing a response. In the first place, Xunzi is explicit that any discussion is valuable because there exist certain standards for assessment, and these standards pertain principally to conceptual clarity, respect for linguistic practices and evidence, and the requirement of consistency and coherence in discourse. A philosophical reconstruction along the lines of the theory of argumentation presents an interesting Confucian view of justification in terms of rational and empirical standards of competence, along with certain desirable qualities of participants in ethical discourse. In this reconstruction of Xunzi's works, ethical justification is a phase of discourse, preceded by explanatory efforts in the clarification of normative claims responsive to a problem of common concern among participants. This in turn presupposes that queries concerning the proper uses of terms are understood by participants in ethical argumentation (Cua 1985a). 11 Historical appeal As widely noted by contemporary writers on Confucian ethics, in argumentative discourse the Confucians are fond of appeal to historical events and paradigmatic individuals. This ethical use of historical knowledge and beliefs is a pervasive feature of Confucianism. A serious student of Chinese philosophy cannot accept the common view that Chinese thinkers are inclined to be uncritical towards their history, or that they believe that history provides the exclusive guidance for present problems and perplexities. A careful examination of the works of Xunzi refutes this thesis. The Confucian respect for tradition and its history, and for exemplary historical persons and events, is best appreciated in terms of four ethical, argumentative uses of the past or historical appeal. These are the pedagogical, rhetorical, elucidative and evaluative uses ( History, Chinese theories of). For Xunzi, the primary aim of moral education is the transformation of man's native but problematic motivational structure (for example, feelings and desires) by way of knowledge of standards of ren, yi and li. One learns for the sake of doing; knowing the right and the good is for the sake of acting in accord with such knowledge. Learning, however, is not equivalent to the mere acquisition of knowledge but more essentially requires understanding and insight. For Xunzi, the basic philosophical issue in moral education pertains to the rational coordination of the intellectual and volitional activities of the mind (xin) by means of the dao. Given the autonomy of mind, one can choose to accept or reject its guidance. If the mind is directed by reason and nourished with clarity and is not perturbed by extraneous matters, ‘it will be capable of determining right and wrong and of resolving doubts' (Xunzi XXI, in Li 1979: 490; trans. in Watson 1963: 131). In sum, the pedagogical use of the historical appeal points not only to models who are worthy or unworthy of emulation, but more significantly to models functioning as reminders in moral learning and conduct that appeal especially to what is deemed in the real interests of the learner. Notably, gentle suasion rather than coercion is involved, as the individual still retains the freedom to accept or reject it. This constitutes the argumentative value of the pedagogical function of the historical appeal rather than the mere exhibition of moral exemplars. The latter's effectiveness lies primarily in the appeal to paradigmatic individuals (junzi) ( Moral education; Moral development). The rhetorical function of the historical appeal is essentially a problem of assurance, of appeal to plausible presumptions or shared beliefs and trustworthiness (xin) ( Xin). When I present reasons supporting my interpretation of the Confucian tradition, I will deploy those unquestioned assumptions in discourse. Also, I expect my fellow Confucians to believe me when I cite information that is presumably known to members of my community. Obviously, the historical appeal functions as a technique for assuring the audience that the thesis maintained is consonant with shared historical beliefs, and obviates having to state reasons for their support. It also constitutes a technique of discounting alternative views, shifting the burden of proof to a possible adversary. These uses, of course, are subject to further challenge, for the rational acceptability of the thesis and an assurance that the thesis is not a mere imaginative contrivance to avoid questioning. The elucidative function of the use of history attempts to clarify the relevance of the past for the present. This is basically an expression of the respect for tradition, clarifying, in interpretation, one's intelligent, critical understanding of the tradition. Of course, the question of evaluation arises in serious Confucian discourse. Inherent in the use of historical characters for elucidating and demonstrating the applicability of an ethical thesis is the implicit claim that human history is the proper subject of ethical appraisal. However, this claim is explicit in the evaluative use of the historical appeal. Notably, the elucidative use of the historical appeal is retrospective; that is, it is the use of the appeal to the past for judging the present (yigu chijin); while the evaluative use is prospective, that is, for the sake of determining the relevance of the past to the present (yijin chigu). In the retrospective use, Xunzi is clearly recommending the adoption of a standpoint based on historical knowledge or beliefs for the purpose of maintaining or assessing the adequacy of current beliefs. The prospective use, however, stresses our knowledge and understanding of our present problematic situations as a basis for assessing the unexamined claims based on the past as a guidance to the present. Both the retrospective and prospective uses of the historical appeal are essentially critical, and can be used either in the positive defence of one's thesis or in the negative evaluation of another's thesis or both. In J.O. Urmson's words, we have here a distinction between standard-invoking and standard-setting aspects of normative discourse (Urmson 1968: 68). In effect, the retrospective use of the historical appeal invokes an established framework with its operative criteria or standards for justification of ethical judgments. Of course, one can always raise external questions about an established practice. The prospective use of the historical appeal reverses the standpoint of the retrospective one. Human history is seen as a subject matter rather than as a basis for ethical judgment. In adopting this standpoint, one can no longer avail oneself of the presumption of the truth of historical beliefs without critical examination, nor can one presume the existence of shared historical knowledge. The key issue here lies in the present evidential grounding of ethical claims (for further discussion see Cua 1985b). In closing, it may be noted that Confucian ethics, like any normative system, presents conceptual problems of interpretation and reconstruction. Attention here has been focused on the Confucian scheme of basic notions and the idea of Confucian tradition (daotong). Doing full justice to the range of Confucian concerns also involves a critical consideration of divergent views on such topics as the relation of the basic notions to human nature, the role of emotions in ethical deliberation and justification, the place of law in an ideal social, political union, and the metaphysical grounding of dao, particularly in the connection of the human and the natural orders. A serious student of Confucian philosophy must consider these problems with reference both to the divisive efforts and tension within the history of Chinese philosophy, and to the significance of these efforts to of Western philosophical inquiries.